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Introduction 
What are the social conditions of living a dignified life? Even though it is a common belief, 
shared by most people for many different reasons, that all human beings possess dignity in 
virtue of being human, most people also believe that one can succeed or fail to live a 
dignified life or a life with dignity. Posing the question of the social conditions of living a 
dignified life shifts the focus from conceptual and ontological considerations about what 
exactly dignity is and why all human beings possess it to phenomenological and sociological 
considerations about what it means to live a life with a sense of one’s own dignity as an 
experiential quality. In this paper I argue for the recognition-theoretical view that living a 
dignified life requires two forms of social recognition: respect and social esteem.1 Whereas 
respect recognises the personhood of the individual subject and is equally owed to every 
subject, esteem recognises a particular quality of an individual subject and is owed to all and 
only those subjects who possess the esteemed quality.2 My argument in this paper is that the 
form of esteem that matters for dignity is social esteem, that is, the recognition of particular 
qualities of individuals insofar as these qualities can be recognised as capacities and 
achievements that contribute to socially shared goals.3 As a result, even though all human 
                                                        
* Many thanks to Paul Bou-Habib, Amneris Chaparro, Lorna Finlayson, Fabian Freyenhagen, Bob Goodin, Sabine 
Michalowski, Tom Parr, Avia Pasternak, Jörg Schaub, audiences at Bristol, Durham, Essex, and the Philosophy and Social 
Science Colloquium in Prague, and two anonymous referees for JPP, for helpful comments. 
1 This recognition-theoretical view is developed in Honneth 1996, 2003a, and in Anderson and Honneth 2005. In this 
paper I draw freely on Honneth’s work, but I also depart from it when necessary. My aim is to make the recognition-theoretical 
view useful for the analysis of dignity, not to offer an “orthodox” Honnethian interpretation of dignity. 
2 For similar distinctions see also Darwall 1977; Sachs 1981. 
3 Honneth 1996, p. 122. 
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beings possess equal dignity in virtue of being human, the ability to live a dignified live is 
distributed unequally among humans.  
 
While the respect requirement is widely accepted in the philosophical literature on 
dignity, the social esteem requirement has received little attention so far. In what follows I 
will explain the distinction between respect and social esteem in more detail and argue that 
in modern capitalist societies social esteem is distributed primarily according to a subject’s 
position in the social division of labour. Next, I will consider three phenomena which pose a 
threat to human dignity because they deprive subjects of social esteem: unemployment, 
precarious employment, and low pay. This will lead me to the interim conclusion that 
substantial social and economic reforms would be needed in order to enable people to live 
dignified lives. However, in the final section of the paper I will argue that attention to the 
social esteem requirement complicates appeals to human dignity as a social-critical concept, 
because it can be asserted as a positional good. When people assert their own dignity by 
comparing themselves favourably to others, who they claim are less dignified, dignity can 
prop up rather than undermine social hierarchies. As a result, the theory outlined in the first 
three sections does not give us the full picture, and dignified lives elude some people despite 
the fact that they make a contribution to socially shared goals. 
 
1. Human Dignity, Respect and Social Esteem 
Living a dignified life means living up to the dignity that one possesses as a human being. In 
particular, it means establishing a sense of self-worth that enables one to conceive of one’s 
own, individual existence as having meaning and value. This sense of self-worth requires 
that subjects cultivate two forms of self-relation: self-respect and self-esteem. While self-
respect assures the subject of its equal worth, that is, of its equal right to pursue its own 
conception of the good, to live its life on its own terms, self-esteem assures the subject of its 
possession of the capacities that are necessary to pursue its good and of the meaningfulness 
and value of that good. It is a central insight of the recognition-theoretical view that both 
  3 
 
self-respect and self-esteem depend on social recognition. Self-respect typically depends on 
being respected, and self-esteem typically depends on being esteemed.4 
 
The relationship between self-respect, respect, and dignity is often recognised. For 
example, according to Joel Feinberg, to have self-respect one must know oneself to be a 
holder of rights and therefore as capable of asserting claims that others must respect. At the 
same time, to have this “recognisable capacity to assert claims” is to have human dignity.5 
Conversely, disrespect poses a threat to human dignity, particularly when it originates from 
an authoritative source. If respect is the interpersonal and institutional recognition of a 
person’s status as “an authoritative source of valid claims”, then denials of that status 
through subordination, marginalization or exclusion are forms of disrespect that typically 
undermine a person’s self-respect, because they undermine her sense that she is everyone 
else’s equal who competently shapes decisions that concern her. This is a threat to human 
dignity, because a dignified life requires a sense of authority and control over one’s own 
destiny. Jeremy Waldron’s interpretation of dignity as a legal status is one prominent 
approach to human dignity that addresses this threat, because on this interpretation the 
point of legal status is to protect the person from disrespect through the public assurance of 
her equal standing.6  
 
The relationship between self-esteem, social esteem, and dignity is more complex. One 
reason for why self-esteem typically depends on social esteem is that most people need the 
reassurance of others in order to assure themselves of the possession of their capacities. A 
second reason is that the meaning and value of a person’s conception of the good or identity 
                                                        
4 Cf. Honneth 1996. This claim is backed up by research in social psychology. According to the leading researcher in the 
field, the importance of reflective appraisals for the self-concept, including its evaluative dimension, self-esteem, “can scarcely 
be overestimated” (Rosenberg 1979, p. 63).  
5 Feinberg 1970, p. 252. For further discussion and critique cf. Meyer 1989.  
6 Cf. Waldron 2007, 2012; also Habermas 2010. Perhaps it does not address it fully, because it focuses on legal standing 
rather than moral standing in general. The former is a vertical relationship, whereas the latter is a horizontal one. 
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are not purely subjective matters. In framing a conception of the good or identity people 
typically appeal to the shared social meanings of their society and compare themselves to 
relevant social reference groups, because it is difficult to pursue a life that is 
incomprehensible to others and therefore cannot be recognised as worthy of pursuit.7 
Research in psychology has confirmed that people engage in such “reflective appraisals”, 
whether they are based on direct reflections, the perceived self or the generalised other, and 
in social comparisons to reassure themselves of their possession of capacities and skills and 
to establish the value of their conception of the good.8 As one recent study puts it: “Social 
skills, attributes, and identities lack absolute value and a clear evaluative metric. Thus other 
people serve as essential reference points for deciding what is normal and what is good, 
providing external standards by which people can comparatively assess their own merit or 
value.”9 
 
To be sure, there are multiple determinants of self-esteem, and not all of them require 
the esteem of others. For example, people gain self-esteem through self-attribution, that is, 
the attribution to themselves of capacities based on their successful exercise of these 
capacities.10 Moreover, the determinants of self-esteem are hierarchically organised and vary 
in their psychological centrality. Rather than assigning equal weight to all components of the 
self, people tend to value the components in which they are strong. For example, people who 
succeed academically tend to value academic success more than those who do not. This is a 
                                                        
7 Again, it is not conceptually impossible to pursue a life that is incomprehensible to others, but it is so difficult to do that it 
becomes practically impossible for most subjects. Cf. Anderson and Honneth 2005, p. 136.  
8 The locus classicus for this research is Rosenberg 1979; cf. especially pp. 62–70. 
9 Wells 2001, pp. 305–306. 
10 Rosenberg 1979, pp. 70–73. People also may be esteemed in interpersonal relations as friends or lovers, or as parents or 
children, and gain self-esteem through this recognition. Finally, people can gain self-esteem through ego-extension, that is, the 
identification with esteemed people or groups, including their family or friends, their sports team or employer, or their racial or 
ethnic group. In materialistic cultures, ego-extension even may extend to inanimate objects, such as expensive consumer goods, 
which testify to the high social status of their owners (Rosenberg 1979, pp. 34–38; Wells 2001, p. 306). 
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powerful defence mechanism, which enables people to maintain self-esteem through 
selectivity in self-evaluation, including self-evaluation through social comparisons.11 
 
Nevertheless, there are limits to selectivity. People may adjust the importance that they 
place on a particular capacity if they do not excel in exercising it, but when this capacity 
becomes salient in their interaction with others or as a necessary means to an end they value, 
they cannot deny their lack of success. Likewise, people can choose who to befriend and with 
whom to socialise, but they cannot choose their neighbours, colleagues or employers. Finally, 
there are limits to value choice, because many of people’s deepest values are acquired early 
in life or are inextricably linked with social role definitions and social group norms.12 In the 
remainder of this paper, I will assume that most people in modern capitalist societies cannot 
avoid seeking social esteem from their peers, even though the centrality of social esteem to 
their self-worth may vary between individuals. The next step in my argument is to examine 
which activities attract social esteem in these societies, and how it is distributed.  
 
The recognition-theoretical view uses the concept of a “recognition order” to analyse the 
distribution of social esteem.13 To conceptualise society as a recognition order is to consider 
it as a normative order that institutionalises the distribution of respect and social esteem and 
therefore expresses the social valuations that most people in this society see as legitimate. 
From this perspective the historical development leading from pre-modern Feudal society to 
modern capitalist society revolutionised our understanding of human dignity by breaking up 
the “alloy of legal respect and social esteem”14. In pre-modern Feudal society dignity was 
essentially honour, where an individual’s rights as a member of society were directly related 
to the social esteem he enjoyed as a member of a specific class, performing a specific 
                                                        
11 Rosenberg 1979, pp. 73–77, 265–69; Gecas 2001, pp. 88–89. 
12 Rosenberg 1979, pp. 277–78. 
13 Honneth 2003a, p. 137. 
14 Honneth 2003a, p. 135. 
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function in society. In modern capitalist society equal respect and social esteem became 
distinct recognition principles.15 In theory, this means that modern subjects enjoy equal 
respect before the law independently of the social esteem that they attract.16 At the same 
time the principle of esteem recognition underwent a revolutionary transformation. The 
individualization of lifestyles and the pluralization of conceptions of human flourishing and 
self-realization narrowed the range of collectively shared values that could orient the 
distribution of social esteem in pre-modern societies. Therefore, in modern societies social 
esteem typically tracks activities that still can be recognised as making a contribution to the 
realization of societal goals.17 They determine, in part, whether people can live dignified lives. 
 
From this perspective it is not surprising that the distribution of social esteem is subject 
to permanent struggles for recognition. Esteem recognition, now distinct from respect 
recognition is a fundamental need of modern subjects, and their ability to live dignified lives 
is threatened if their contributions to socially shared goals are insufficiently recognised or 
misrecognised, or if subjects cannot or do not make such a contribution to socially shared 
goals. But since it is a matter of interpretation what counts as estimable activity, individuals 
and social groups are permanently engaged in cultural conflicts about the shape of the 
recognition order itself. They demand more recognition for their own activities where they 
feel that their social usefulness is undervalued, or they struggle for recognition where their 
contribution is not valued at all. Thus people’s ability to live dignified lives depends on the 
balance of interpretative or symbolic power in society as much as on the balance of material 
power, because these power relations in society determine the normative standards 
according to which social esteem is distributed.  
 
                                                        
15 Honneth 2003a, pp. 139–40. 
16 In practice, respect and esteem recognition remain interdependent. See my discussion in §2 below. 
17 Honneth 1996, p. 122. 
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The recognition-theoretical view is descriptive and normative at once. On the descriptive 
level it aims to elucidate the standards through which respect and esteem are distributed in 
the modern capitalist recognition order. On the normative level it can offer an immanent 
critique of this recognition order by evaluating the extent to which its distribution of respect 
and esteem lives up to its own standards. Modern capitalist societies purport to distribute 
social esteem according to the normative standard of “individual achievement”, which ought 
to effect a meritocratic distribution of social esteem according to a subject’s contribution to 
society as a “productive citizen.” 18  However, its immanent critique reveals significant 
ideological distortions that severely limit the kinds of activity that can be recognised as 
estimable. First, not all life projects that contribute to socially shared goals are best 
understood in terms of individual achievement, and, second, the standard of individual 
achievement used here is interpreted in an “ideological” and “one-sided” way, with the effect 
that many forms of work that clearly make important contributions to socially shared goals 
are either insufficiently esteemed or misrecognised.19 Conversely, some work that is highly 
esteemed in modern capitalist societies makes very little valuable contribution to socially 
shared goals. In general, what counts as “work” in modern capitalist societies is determined 
by substantive value judgments that undervalue or disvalue entire areas of activity, such as 
care work, childcare or housework, while valuing others, such as “investment in intellectual 
preparation for a specific activity.”20  
 
Given the narrow range of recognisable achievement in the capitalist recognition order, it 
is not surprising that paid work through regular employment is the principal activity through 
which subjects seek social esteem from their fellow subjects, and this has important 
implications for the self-image of individual subjects: “The majority of the population 
continues to attach their own social identity primarily to their role in the organized labor 
                                                        
18 Honneth 2003a, pp. 140, 141. 
19 Honneth 2003a, pp. 141, 142. 
20 Honneth 2003a, p. 147; cf. Sennett and Cobb 1972. 
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process.”21 This remains true, even though in post-industrial societies work has become less 
stable for many, and, as a result, the ways in which some people identify with their work has 
changed.22 Likewise, I do not wish to deny that there are other avenues through which 
people can gain social esteem. Clearly, many activities that people engage in outside of the 
workplace or instead of paid work contribute to socially shared goals and are recognised as 
such. Nevertheless, given the importance of work for subjects’ sense of their social identity, it 
is not surprising that work and the workplace are principal loci of struggles for human 
dignity, where workers stake the claim for the value of their particular contribution. 
Moreover, salaries, other benefits and even working conditions become media for the 
distribution of social esteem and proxies for its measurement, so that even where people 
have merely instrumental rather than identity-constituting attitudes to work, it nevertheless 
shapes their social identities, and ultimately their ability to live dignified lives, indirectly 
through the income and status that it provides.  
 
This explanation of how work contributes to human dignity differs from two related 
arguments about the requirements of a dignified life. First, according to Avishai Margalit, all 
a dignified life requires is a meaningful occupation in the sense of “an occupation that 
confers meaning on the life of the one engaged in it.”23 It follows from this that a decent 
society, that is, a society that does not humiliate people, “provides all its members with the 
opportunity to find at least one reasonably meaningful occupation.”24 However, Margalit’s 
                                                        
21 Honneth 2010, p. 223. 
22 For example, the traditional identity of the “male breadwinner” has come under strain where industry has given way to 
services, while women’s normative commitment to paid work has increased. Overall, a recent survey of the sociology of work 
concludes that “there has been no ‘revolution’ in work orientations or the meaning of work…Survey data suggests that non-
financial commitment to work remains robust and provides no support for the idea of any decline in the work ethic over recent 
decades” (Grint and Nixon 2015, p. 322).  André Gorz’s vision of a society in which “[s]ocially useful labour, distributed over all 
those willing and able to work, will…cease to be anyone’s exclusive or leading activity” (1982, p. 3), has not materialised. Of 
course, this is not to say that Gorz’s vision is not desirable. I will return to this point at the beginning of §4 below. 
23 Margalit 1996, p. 253. 
24 Margalit 1996, p. 254. 
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conception of meaningfulness is subjective in the sense that an occupation is meaningful for 
a person if and only if that person derives meaning from it.25 Thus, a person can life a 
dignified life if she derives meaning from an utterly self-absorbed occupation, such as 
counting the blades of grass in her garden. In contrast, according to the recognition-
theoretical view that I have developed here, living a dignified life requires an occupation that 
attracts social esteem, because it is recognised as a contribution to socially shared goals. It is 
not sufficient for an occupation to be meaningful in the lesser sense of being recognisable as 
an activity that is meaningful to the person engaged in it, because such an utterly self-
absorbed occupation cannot attract social esteem, and, therefore, cannot ground the self-
esteem that is a necessary condition for a dignified life. This is not to deny that a person can 
gain happiness, satisfaction or even self-realisation through an occupation that is 
subjectively meaningful in Margalit’s sense. But a dignified life requires more than that. 
Living up to one’s human dignity requires that one pursues an occupation that can be 
recognised as socially useful by others. 
 
Second, the recognition-theoretical argument for how work contributes to human dignity 
also differs from the possible argument that a dignified life requires meaningful work in a 
much more substantial sense. According to Adina Schwartz and Beate Roessler, autonomy 
requires that meaningful work be complex and varied, allows people to draw on their skills 
and talents, and be organised in such a way as to give workers significant decision-making 
power about the organisation of the work and the direction of the enterprise as a whole.26 
While neither Schwartz nor Roessler explicitly argue that living a dignified life requires 
meaningful work in this substantial sense, one may think that durable violations of a 
person’s autonomy undermine their dignity too. However, as stated, this claim is too strong. 
                                                        
25 Margalit seems to claim that subjective meaningfulness is sufficient for self-esteem and self-worth (1996, p. 253). It is 
not clear to me why that should be the case, and the recognition-theoretical view raises some doubts about this claim when it 
points to the importance of social esteem for self-esteem and self-worth. 
26 Cf. Schwartz 1982; Roessler 2012. Schwartz does not refer to dignity. Roessler frequently uses “meaningless” and 
“undignified” in the same breadth, but it is unclear whether the latter follows from the former or is independent of it.  
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Clearly, many people live dignified lives while doing routine work that is simple and 
monotonous. A lot of care work is like this. And a lot of care work also does not require many 
special skills or talents, although it may require character traits such as empathy and 
patience. I believe that care workers gain dignity from their work precisely because it is 
obviously socially useful. On the other hand, when care workers feel that they cannot live 
dignified lives, this often is because of the organisation of their work, or its precarity, or the 
low pay, rather than the work itself. This seems to be true in general. Work is not 
meaningless or undignified when it is simple and monotonous, but when workers cannot see 
the purpose of such work or are not recognised for performing it. Similarly, it is implausible 
that significant decision-making power at work is required for a dignified life. To be sure, the 
requirement of equal respect, rather than that of social esteem, establishes limits to the 
power that others can exercise over us if we are to be recognised as persons. Thus, work may 
become undignified when the authority that others yield over us is arbitrary or excessive. 
However, according to the recognition-theoretical view, in many cases we can consent to 
work under the direction of others without sacrificing our dignity.  
 
To be clear, I do not deny the influence of meaningful work in the substantial sense on 
self-esteem, human flourishing and self-realisation.27 Its distribution may be a matter of 
social justice, especially since the ideological and one-sided way in which achievement is 
interpreted may mean that substantially meaningful work is more highly esteemed (see also 
§4 below), and its absence or erosion in modern capitalist society a legitimate object of social 
criticism.28  However, I do not think that meaningful work in this sense is a necessary 
condition for living a dignified life. As I will show in the next section, unemployed people are 
                                                        
27 In fact, research suggests that “occupational self-direction”, that is, freedom from close supervision and substantively 
complex tasks requiring a variety of approaches, is a source of self-esteem (Kohn and Schooler 1982; Schooler and Oates 2001). 
28 On meaningful work and social justice cf. Muirhead 2004; Moriarty 2009; Arnold 2012. For a social critique of work in 
contemporary capitalism cf. Gorz 1982; Sennett 1999. 
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primarily worried about being seen as useless, as not making a contribution to socially 
shared goals, rather than about having substantially meaningful work. 
 
2. Unemployment and Human Dignity 
The importance of work as an individual’s contribution to socially shared goals has been 
noted in the sociological literature on work. Thus, in his classic report of working life, 
Working, Studs Terkel writes that work “is about a search, too, for daily meaning as well as 
daily bread, for recognition as well as cash, for astonishment rather than torpor; in short, for 
a sort of life rather than a Monday through Friday sort of dying. Perhaps immortality, too, is 
part of the quest. To be remembered was the wish, spoken and unspoken, of the heroes and 
heroines of this book.” 29  People seek work that is meaningful to them, but that 
meaningfulness derives from their conviction that it is socially useful and recognised as such. 
Hence the reference to immortality, and to being remembered. The same idea is at work in 
Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb’s classic study The Hidden Injuries of Class. Cobb’s 
“Afterword” explains this attitude to work particularly well when he discusses one of their 
interviewees: “the worthiness granted a person, and that he sometimes accepts as his own, is 
not an abstraction all-internal to the self, nor a purely relative issue of different personal 
abilities, but stems from the social value placed on his labors.”30 Again, people think about 
the meaning and value of their work, and therefore of the dignity of their lives, in terms of 
their usefulness to others. This importance of work also explains why forced unemployment 
is experienced as humiliating and a severe threat to human dignity. 
 
Ever since Marie Jahoda and her colleagues studied the unemployed of Marienthal in 
1930, research has testified to the social-psychological, as well as the monetary, cost of 
unemployment for individuals and society as a whole.31 Curiously, the language of dignity is 
                                                        
29 Terkel 1974, p. 1. 
30 Sennett and Cobb 1972, p. 264. 
31 Jahoda et al. 1972. 
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largely absent from more recent sociological research. In some cases, this absence may be 
due to an attempt to capture the negative experience of unemployment through objective 
indicators, such as correlations with ill health, disability or divorce. In other cases, 
researchers focus on subjective wellbeing and psychological adjustment, but they do not 
report in detail on people’s own assessment of how unemployment affects their sense of self-
worth and therefore their dignity.32 Nevertheless, some important studies lend support to 
the thesis that unemployment threatens human dignity, even though they describe the 
relevant phenomenology in other terms. 
 
For present purposes the relationship between unemployment and social esteem is of 
central importance. If dignity requires respect and social esteem, and in modern capitalist 
societies social esteem recognises an individual’s contribution to socially shared goals, then 
being unemployed means being excluded from a principal source of social esteem. This 
consequence of unemployment is confirmed over and over again in sociological and 
psychological studies of unemployment. 33  In particular, the relationship between being 
useful to society, making a contribution to society, and social esteem is very apparent. Thus, 
summarising research on unemployment during the 1930s, Jahoda writes “the unemployed 
during the great depression suffered from a sense of purposelessness. The phrases repeated 
in virtually all studies are: being on the scrap-heap, useless, not needed by anybody.”34 She 
also notes the loss of social status and personal identity, both of which are defined to a large 
degree by one’s job.35 There are no reasons to believe that these experiences have lost their 
relevance today36; indeed, similar experiences are reported elsewhere in the literature.37  
 
                                                        
32 Gallie et al. 1994. 
33 Jahoda 1982; Marsden 1982; Kelvin and Jarrett 1985; Warr 1987. 
34 Jahoda 1982, p. 24. 
35 Jahoda 1982, p. 26; cf. Warr 1987, p. 224. 
36 Jahoda 1982, p. 83; cf. Gershuny 1994. 
37 Marsden 1982, pp. 206–207; Kelvin and Jarrett 1985, p. 72. 
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While these studies do not discuss unemployment in terms of human dignity, I want to 
argue that the experiences they describe exhibit its conceptual structure. Unemployed people 
lack self-worth, because they feel that they cannot contribute anything of social worth and be 
recognised for their contribution, and that their lives have no meaning and value because of 
this. The esteem dimension of recognition, split off from the respect dimension, remains 
integral to the way in which the unemployed person constructs his or her own dignity.38  
 
More generally, the problem of unemployment illustrates the persistent interdependence 
of respect and esteem recognition in the social construction of dignity. On the one hand, 
many struggles for recognition in the sphere of social esteem, including struggles for social-
welfare benefits for the unemployed, but also for better working conditions, have been 
transformed into struggles about social rights, so that unemployment benefits and decent 
working conditions are no longer seen as expressions of esteem for the social contribution of 
workers but of respect for their equal rights.39 In fact, Honneth conceives of this boundary-
shifting between recognition spheres as a form of moral progress, because it decouples social 
rights from the need for justification in terms of individual achievement.40 This seems right, 
because the legal guarantee of social-welfare entitlements establishes the social minimum as 
something that one is due as everyone’s equal, rather than as a social inferior.41  
 
On the other hand, however, the demonization of the unemployed as skivers and the 
attempts to curtail their social rights are obvious examples of the erosion of respect based on 
a prior erosion of social esteem. The “social stigma”42 of unemployment cuts across the 
                                                        
38 Moreover, unemployment makes subjects dependent on others for support, and others see them as so dependent. This 
further undermines the human dignity of the unemployed where being self-reliant is an important part of being dignified (Sayer 
2007, p. 570; see also LaVaque-Manty 2009, pp. 114–17, on overcoming vulnerability). 
39 Honneth 2003a, p. 149; cf. Marshall 1992. 
40 Honneth 2003a, p. 188. 
41 Cf. Anderson 1999. 
42 Honneth 2010, p. 224. 
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respect and esteem dimensions of human dignity. Once a class of subjects is characterised as 
useless and replaceable and therefore not worthy of social esteem, their ability to exact the 
equal respect that is due to them as citizens in the form of social rights is undermined, too.43 
Social-psychological research also confirms this interdependence of respect and social 
esteem. Kelvin and Jarrett write  
 
[T]here is a taken-for-granted assumption that whatever other differences there 
might be between individuals in a democracy they are nevertheless equal as citizens. 
Unemployed people, on the other hand, frequently feel that they are treated as 
‘second-class citizens’: and when one examines the conditions for obtaining welfare 
benefit, especially means-related benefits, it is quite incontrovertible that these 
involve invasions of the privacy of claimants which would be deemed intolerable in 
relation to ‘ordinary’ men and women.44  
 
The threat to human dignity through the denial of equal respect to welfare-benefit claimants 
has been noted in normative political philosophy45; the recognition-theoretical view adds the 
insight that there is a substantive relationship between lacking social esteem and being able 
to claim one’s rights. Once a person is no longer seen as making a contribution to socially 
shared goals, her ability to insist on her equality with others in other areas of life is also 
threatened. Moreover, where mutual esteem is no longer possible, dignity can be asserted as 
a positional good. This is the case when workers assert their superiority over the unemployed 
as a means to articulate their sense of dignity. I will return to this thorny issue in §4 below, 
but before that I want to discuss how human dignity can be threatened in employment as 
well as in unemployment.  
 
                                                        
43 Cf. Honneth and Stahl 2013, p. 283. 
44 Kelvin and Jarrett 1985, p. 5.  
45 Cf. Wolff 1998. 
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3. Employment and Human Dignity 
Recent media reporting has drawn attention to two phenomena which can be experienced as 
threats to human dignity in employment: precarity and low pay. In what follows I want to 
show that the recognition-theoretical view explains why they can be so experienced. Of 
course, I do not claim that precarity and low pay are the only threats to dignity at work. A 
quick look at research in the sociology of work concerned with dignity reveals a concern with 
abuse, bullying and harassment, and dirty, dangerous and demeaning work.46 However, 
while I agree that dignity is threatened in all of these phenomena, abuse, bullying and 
harassment are forms of disrespect and humiliation, rather than consequences of the 
absence or withdrawal of social esteem, and it is the relationship between dignity and social 
esteem that I am interested in here.47  
 
The conception of modern capitalist society as a recognition order provides the key to 
understanding why phenomena such as precarity and low pay should be understood as 
threats to human dignity, because the recognition order institutionalises the distribution of 
respect and social esteem. Of course, any given recognition order is open to contestation, and 
struggles for recognition are struggles about how recognition principles are to be applied. 
However, broadly speaking, the existing recognition order expresses a normative view about 
how respect and esteem ought to be distributed. From this perspective the labour market is 
not an anonymous market mechanism where supply and demand determine the cost of 
labour and the terms and conditions under which it can be employed. Rather, the labour 
market is a complex social institution in which “efficiency considerations…are inextricably 
fused with cultural views of the social world”, which determine the social value of a 
                                                        
46 Hodson 2001; Bolton 2007; Sayer 2007. There also is some concern with the right to meaningful work in the substantial 
sense that I discussed in §2 above. 
47 This response simplifies the complexity of these phenomena. As I noted in §2 above, there are many cases in which the 
erosion of respect is based on a prior erosion of social esteem, and this dynamic may well explain many instances of abuse, 
bullying and harassment. 
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particular job or profession.48 Until recently, in modern capitalist societies labour markets 
were tightly regulated, and these regulations expressed these societies’ understandings of 
desert and justice and of the specific vulnerabilities to which workers are exposed: “From the 
perspective of those affected, the social-legal constraints of the employment contract 
represent not merely a functional safeguard of their capacity to work, but a moral guarantee 
of the social recognition of their dignity and status.”49 If this is right, then precarity and low 
pay have an expressive dimension that subjects experience in addition to the economic 
dimension. To see this, consider them in more detail. 
 
Recent discussions about the rise of the so-called precariat have drawn attention to the 
experience of precariousness as the defining feature of many people’s lives. 50  As Guy 
Standing has pointed out, the insecurity that is characteristic of precariousness has many 
dimensions, which can be contrasted with seven forms of traditional labour security, 
including employment security, job security and income security.51 The less security subjects 
                                                        
48 Honneth 2003a, p. 156. 
49 Honneth 2003b, p. 253. 
50 LaVaque-Manty 2009; Standing 2011. 
51 Standing’s seven dimensions of security are: 
“Labour market security – Adequate income-earning opportunities; at the macro-level this is epitomised by a government 
commitment to ‘full employment’. 
Employment security – Protection against arbitrary dismissal, regulations on hiring and firing, imposition of costs on 
employers for failing to adhere to rules and so on. 
Job security – Ability and opportunity to retain a niche in employment, plus barriers to skill dilution, and opportunities for 
‘upward’ mobility in terms of status and income. 
Work security – Protection against accidents and illness at work, through, for example, safety and health regulations, limits on 
working time, unsociable hours, night work for women, as well as compensation for mishaps. 
Skill reproduction security – Opportunity to gain skills, through apprenticeships, employment training and so on, as well as 
opportunity to make use of competencies. 
Income security – Assurance of an adequate stable income, protected through, for example, minimum wage machinery, wage 
indexation, comprehensive social security, progressive taxation to reduce inequality and to supplement low incomes. 
Representation Security – Possessing a collective voice in the labour market, through, for example, independent trade unions, 
with a right to strike.” (Standing 2011, p. 10) 
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enjoy in these dimensions of labour security, the more precarious their lives are. Subjects 
adopt instrumental and opportunistic attitudes toward work and may experience anger, 
anomie, anxiety and alienation in the face of their precarious existence.52 This experience is 
not limited to low-skilled workers, or migrants or women, though these groups are 
disproportionately affected; neither is it limited to the private sector, though it is more 
pronounced there. But whatever distinguishes members of the precariat, they are trapped in 
jobs that do not offer them a stable future and, as a result, they do not identify with their jobs 
or their labour, and they do not profit as much from the rewards of their labour as they 
would, if they had stable jobs.53 As Standing puts it: “Those in the precariat lack self-esteem 
and social worth in their work.”54 
 
The recognition-theoretical view is well suited to explain why precariousness or 
precarization – the process through which subjects’ lives become precarious – can be 
experienced as a threat to human dignity. The threat arises from a dialectic of autonomy and 
dependence. On the one hand, humans are autonomous agents and to treat them as mere 
means disrespects them. On the other hands, humans are interdependent and find meaning 
and value in being useful to others, in fulfilling others’ needs. 55  On the recognition-
theoretical view, the division of labour in modern capitalist societies institutionalises the 
ways in which subjects use their specific abilities and skills to make a contribution to the 
common good. However, this division of labour can be experienced as legitimate only if it 
respects subjects’ autonomy as well as their interdependence. This requires an organisation 
of labour that enables workers to gain self-esteem through their work.56 Neither the exercise 
                                                        
52 Standing 2011, pp. 12, 19–24. In fact, one recent study has found that “those men who are in insecure employment at the 
disadvantaged end of the labour market suffer approximately the same level of psychological disadvantage as the unemployed 
themselves” (Burchell 1994, p. 207). 
53 Cf. Wolff and de-Shalit 2009, pp. 63–73. 
54 Standing 2011, p. 21. 
55 Sayer 2007, pp. 569–70; cf. Sennett and Cobb 1972, p. 266. 
56 Honneth 2010, p. 231. 
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of specific abilities and skills nor contribution to the common good is an atomistic act; 
abilities and skills must be developed and nurtured, and contributions to the common good 
unfold over a period of productive activity.57 Precarization undermines the self-esteem that 
subjects gain through their work, and therefore, threatens their dignity, because it abstracts 
from these social and temporal dimensions of labour. Treating labour like any other 
commodity, precarization disembeds it from the moral norms which render the modern 
division of labour legitimate and reduces it to its monetary exchange value. The increasing 
use of fixed-term contracts is the most obvious example of this; it reduces the fixed costs of 
labour through a transfer of risk from employer to employee.58 The erosion of non-monetary 
benefits, such as health insurance and pensions, is another example of this re-
commodification, rendering subjects more vulnerable to the risks of ill health and old age 
poverty.59 At the same time, the precariously employed are made acutely aware of the fact 
that their social contribution is held to be of a very low value.60  
 
Similarly, I want to argue that the existence of poorly paid work threatens the human 
dignity of those who do this work. This is particularly true of work that does not pay a living 
wage, that is, that does not pay well enough for the worker to live off it. To see this, consider 
the findings of Lisa Dodson, who has analysed the personal and social consequences of low-
paid jobs in the US, focusing on their detrimental effects on children and health. Her most 
                                                        
57 The threat to dignity that precariously employed workers face is exacerbated by the constant need to reassert their 
abilities and skills to potential employers (Standing 2011, p. 49). 
58 Honneth 2010, p. 232; Standing 2011, pp. 31–36. 
59 Standing 2011, pp. 41–42. 
60 Of course, this brief analysis does not cover all precarious employment. As Standing also notes, some precariously 
employed workers are highly skilled and compensated. They may not experience precariousness as a threat to their dignity but 
as freedom. But they are in the minority. 
Moreover, precariousness is experienced negatively against the background of social expectations associated with 
traditional labour security. As a result, precariousness may pose less of a threat to people’s ability to live dignified lives, if 
precarious employment becomes more common and more commonly accepted. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for JPP 
for alerting me to this.  
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intriguing findings concern the moral conclusions that ordinary Americans, low-paid and 
better-paid, draw from the existence of jobs that do not provide a livelihood for those who do 
them, and who leave low-paid workers to juggle impossible workloads with care obligations. 
There is a widespread sense that the economic system responsible for these effects is unfair, 
and that the right thing to do in these circumstances often is to break the rules and to help 
low-paid workers. Many managers risk their own jobs to help their employees, be it by 
padding pay cheques, manipulating hours, ignoring infractions, or by giving them food or 
clothes to take home.61 More importantly, Dodson argues that the unfairness of the economy 
leads many Americans to doubt the value of work. 
 
What most people explained, in story after story, was that even during the wealth-
boom years there was always another America. There were always millions of families 
with earnings so low they struggled to pay for heat, food, transportation, childcare, 
and health care […] And they went beyond personal stories; they analyzed how 
economic mistreatment degrades the very value of work in America. Why should 
those people cherish jobs that the larger society holds in such low regard? Would 
you?62  
 
This analysis goes to the heart of my concern in this section. People in low-paid jobs cannot 
cherish their work, because they know that it is not socially valued. And they know that 
because the low value that society places on it is expressed in the low pay they receive for 
doing it. Money is a medium of social esteem, and therefore pay is an expression of the value 
of one’s work to the organisation, to society and, ultimately, to the worker herself.63 Where 
pay is so low that it does not provide a livelihood for the worker, she is essentially told that 
                                                        
61 Dodson 2009, pp. 17–25. 
62 Dodson 2009, p. 190. 
63 Geoghegan 2007, p. 236. 
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her capacities are not worth the cost of keeping her alive. Clearly, it is very difficult to 
maintain a sense of self-worth and therefore dignity under these circumstances.  
 
This connection between low pay and a lack of dignity sometimes has been recognised. 
The demand that there be a national minimum wage, “so that men [sic] may live in dignity”, 
was one of the demands read out at the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom right 
after Martin Luther King’s “I Have a Dream” speech in August 1963.64 More than 50 years 
later, President Barack Obama expressed support for the same argument when he told an 
audience at a Laborfest rally in Milwaukee on Labor Day that “[a]ll across the country right 
now, there’s a national movement going on made up of fast-food workers organizing to lift 
wages, so they can provide for their families with pride and dignity.” 65 And in one 2014 
survey 58% of respondents agreed that a job that does not cover basic living expenses cannot 
give a person dignity.66 The recognition-theoretical view explains why that is.  
 
Note that this explanation for why low-paid work threatens human dignity does not 
imply that low-paid workers cannot find any dignity in their work. The persistence of a “work 
ethic”67 in modern capitalist societies means that workers may find some self-worth in their 
ability to work at all, to be self-reliant, to earn money and to be useful at all.68 However, such 
assertions of dignity often are directed against those who do not work and serve to bolster 
the dignity of those who assert it through a favourable comparison with people who are 
worse off than they are. This phenomenon points to problematic aspects of the struggle for 
dignity. 
 
4. Dignity and Comparative Worth 
                                                        
64 Allegretto and Pitts 2013, p. 2. 
65 Quoted in Finnegan 2014. 
66 Swanson and Delaney 2014. 
67 Bauman 1998, Chap. 1 and 4. 
68 Sayer 2007, p. 570. 
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So far, I have argued that unemployment, precarity and low pay are threats to human 
dignity, because they undermine the sense of self-worth that people derive from the work 
they do. If this is right, an interim conclusion suggests itself. In order to protect the dignity of 
their members, societies must do more than grant them equal legal standing before the law. 
They also must strive to achieve full employment, protect employment security and ensure 
that workers are decently paid in order to afford them the opportunity to lead lives in which 
their contribution to socially shared goals is recognised. And, given the structural changes in 
the labour markets of post-industrial societies, these societies also would do well to broaden 
the range of estimable activities in which citizens can engage outside of the workplace or 
instead of paid labour.69 This is a significant result, because it shows that the protection of 
human dignity requires substantial social and economic reform. However, in the remainder 
of this paper I want to suggest that matters are more complicated still, and that these 
reforms may not be enough. The comparative nature of social esteem in modern capitalist 
societies means that the theory outlined in §§1–3 above does not give us the full picture, and 
even those who do contribute to socially shared goals may not be able to live dignified lives. 
 
The capitalist recognition order distributes social esteem unequally, because it purports 
to track a person’s contribution to socially shared values, and not everyone can or does make 
an equal contribution to such values. Moreover, the capitalist recognition order understands 
this contribution in terms of “individual achievement.” Thus it closely ties together a 
person’s ability and her social usefulness. But not everyone has the same ability to achieve 
socially useful things, and not everyone can develop such ability to the same degree. As a 
result, the capitalist recognition order issues in a social status order in which social esteem is 
unequally distributed between people. This would be true, even if this order were to track 
genuine social contributions and to reward genuine achievements. In reality, where the 
capitalist recognition order is ideologically distorted and one-sided, the distribution of social 
                                                        
69 Cf. Gorz 1982. It would be desirable if people could make social contributions outside of the organised division of labour, 
which always involves an element of heteronomy. 
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esteem reproduces and legitimises the existing hierarchies of social class and prestige. And 
in such a hierarchical class society, many struggle to establish dignity in their lives, as dignity 
becomes comparative and positional in nature. 
 
To see this, consider the struggles for dignity of the Bostonian working class men 
interviewed in Sennett and Cobb’s The Hidden Injuries of Class.70 The central contradiction 
of their lives is that in order to be recognised as equals they must demonstrate individual 
achievement, but in order to do so, they must assert their superiority over others in 
competitive ways. They see college-educated, white-collar, upper-middle-class people as 
their social superiors and as a threat to their own dignity, because they perceive these people 
as possessing a culture and education that enables them to live their lives with a sense of 
self-control and independence that individualises them in their own eyes and in the eyes of 
others. In contrast, the working class men see themselves as part of the masses. A worker 
“has to want upward mobility in order to establish dignity in his own life”, because that will 
individualise him and distinguish him from the masses.71  However, the men who have 
achieved upward mobility feel very ambivalent about their successes. While educated upper-
middle-class people seem naturally entitled and suited to work at complex tasks or direct 
others, the working class men feel like impostors, and they do not value the powers and 
privileges that come with their success. For example, they do not value directing others. Thus 
the esteem that they receive from others does not translate into self-esteem, because they do 
not believe it to be rightfully theirs.72  
 
Moreover, while working class men do not feel that they deserve their upward social 
mobility, they do feel responsible for failing to achieve such mobility. To be sure, they 
                                                        
70 Sennett and Cobb 1972. In what follows I cannot do justice to Sennett and Cobb’s complex argument. Instead, I focus on 
aspects of their discussion that support my argument in this section.  
71 Sennett and Cobb 1972, p. 22. 
72 Sennett and Cobb 1972, pp. 22–23. 
  23 
 
recognise the injustice of some people being given the opportunity to be educated and to 
develop their capacities while others are not and insist that individuals should not be judged 
on the basis of their social standing.73 However, at the same time they wonder whether it is 
not really their own fault that they have not made the most of their opportunities and, 
therefore, should be judged as inferior after all.74 This existential insecurity about their worth 
as persons prevents them from politicising their struggle for dignity. In this situation 
workers are reduced to wrest their dignity from personal sacrifice. They will take on extra 
work, work longer hours, deprive themselves of the joys of family life, and adopt 
authoritarian parenting styles in order to enable their children to escape from a working 
class existence. Just like the men who have gone to war, working class men feel that their 
personal sacrifice individualises them and give them the right to judge others.75 Of course, 
this personal sacrifice leaves them vulnerable to disappointment; if their children do not 
choose a respectable career path or are unsuccessful, their parents’ dignity will be imperilled 
along with their own. 
 
At this stage of the argument, one crucial question is whether relationships of solidarity 
within the working class can replace the feelings of injured dignity that working class men 
experience in their lives. Is it possible to develop a “counterculture of dignity”76 amongst 
working class colleagues or neighbours? A study by Michèle Lamont suggests that workers 
“strive to maintain a sense of self-worth and dignity, and to achieve this, they develop 
alternative measuring sticks that can be viewed as key elements in a culture of resistance.”77 
In particular, they elaborate a value system around hard work, personal integrity and 
traditional morality78, and elaborate a critique of upper-middle-class life that shows this 
                                                        
73 Sennett and Cobb 1972, pp. 38–39. 
74 Sennett and Cobb 1972, pp. 94–97. 
75 Sennett and Cobb 1972, pp. 149–50. 
76 Sennett and Cobb 1972, p. 83. 
77 Lamont 2000, p. 147. 
78 Lamont 2000, p. 51. 
  24 
 
class as wanting when it comes to living up to these values.79 However, one major obstacle to 
such a counterculture is the fact that the attitude that workers take toward upper-middle-
class ideals is fundamentally ambivalent. While they criticise these ideals in terms of their 
own values, they aspire to make possible such a cultured and educated existence for their 
children to the point of sacrificing their own freedom and happiness. This suggests that the 
traditional morality is mostly defensive, rather than a genuine alternative avenue to 
dignity.80 
 
Most importantly, though, the dignity of working men does not transcend the 
comparative and positional way in which dignity is asserted in class societies. While this may 
look like a legitimate strategy of resistance when it is directed at a privileged class, it is 
morally problematic when it is directed at a class, gender, ethnicity or race that is perceived 
to be inferior. Unfortunately, there is ample evidence for such assertions of dignity against 
vulnerable groups. Thus Sennett and Cobb interpret the widespread hostile attitudes of 
Bostonian working class men toward welfare recipients and single mothers as a corollary of 
their sacrifice mentality. They only can assert their dignity through personal sacrifices, but 
this assertion only can succeed if these sacrifices are necessary for their families to survive 
and thrive. The existence of welfare recipients who live without work and of single mothers 
who live without male breadwinners threatens the self-conception of working class men, 
because they undermine the idea that their sacrifices are necessary.81 Likewise, the workers 
interviewed in Lamont’s study show contempt for welfare recipients and other groups that 
they consider their inferiors, because their value system is built around ideas of hard work, 
self-sufficiency and individual responsibility, and they blame the poor, the unemployed and 
the homeless, amongst others, for their predicament. In fact, some of these workers 
                                                        
79 Lamont 2000, p. 147. 
80 This also may be due to the limits of psychological selectivity discussed in §1 above. Lamont’s workers cannot avoid 
entirely social comparisons with other members of the society in which they live. 
81 Sennett and Cobb 1972, pp. 135–36. 
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explicitly assert their own superior status by comparing themselves to these groups. 
Moreover, many white workers associate poverty and unemployment with black people and 
offer racist explanations of their own superiority.82 
 
Once there is a “contest for dignity”83, it is costly to consider one’s colleagues and 
neighbours as equals, and it becomes even harder to see poor and unemployed people as 
one’s equals. Fraternity and solidarity with others threatens one’s own individuality and 
social status, rather than securing it. The price of one’s own dignity may be the denigration 
of others as inferior. The problem is that this contest for dignity seems to be a necessary 
consequence of class society. As soon as social esteem is distributed according to social 
contribution, and that contribution is individualised, people cannot help but compare 
themselves to others, and where class differences exist, members of the working class will 
draw on the achievements and ideals of their class in order to defend their dignity in light of 
their ambiguous attitudes toward their perceived social superiors and sharply distinguish 
themselves from those who they perceive as their social inferiors. The need to distinguish 
oneself from the masses makes it impossible to gain self-worth through non-comparative 
achievement. Is it possible to disarm this threat to human dignity? 
 
A brief passage in Rawls’ Justice as Fairness suggests that it may be disarmed, as long as 
the right background conditions are in place. In particular, Rawls suggests that under his 
preferred social and economic regime, property-owning democracy, ownership of productive 
assets and human capital (education, skills) will be widespread, and fair equality of 
opportunity will be secured. Under these conditions, even the least advantaged should be 
able to lead dignified lives. He writes: “Although they control fewer resources, they are doing 
their full share on terms recognized by all as mutually advantageous and consistent with 
                                                        
82 Lamont 2000, pp. 131–36. 
83 Sennett and Cobb 1972, p. 147. 
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everyone’s self-respect.”84 In other words, in a property-owning democracy, even the least 
advantaged should enjoy social esteem for their contribution to socially shared goals, and it 
does not matter that the more advantaged may enjoy more social esteem. While an equal 
distribution of social esteem is utopian, due to the fact that people differ in their abilities and 
inclinations, and therefore cannot or do not contribute equally to socially shared goals, in a 
well-ordered society there is a threshold of social esteem that is sufficient for a dignified life 
which even the least advantaged can meet, so that nobody falls below this threshold and 
must live an undignified life.  
 
It is difficult to judge the plausibility of Rawls’ suggestion, because the highly idealised 
circumstances of property-owning democracy differ so much from modern capitalist 
societies. In particular, it is impossible to know whether the members of this society in fact 
would enjoy the social esteem that they should enjoy, and would be less likely to engage in 
the contests for dignity that Sennett and Cobb and Lamont describe. Rawls notes that 
significant economic inequality may lead to social status harms85, and he seems to believe 
that the lower degree of inequality under a regime property-owning democracy coupled with 
the widespread dispersal of ownership of productive assets would facilitate a distribution of 
social esteem that avoids such harms to the least advantaged.86  
 
However, there are reasons to be sceptical. Recent research in social psychology suggests 
that social comparison and status-enhancing consumption may depend less on the level of 
equality between potential competitors than on whether they are primed for competition and 
                                                        
84 Rawls 2003, p. 139. It has been noted in the literature that Rawls does not always consistently distinguish between self-
respect and self-esteem (cf. Moriarty 1999), and even where he does, his distinctions work differently from mine. Nevertheless, 
it seems clear that in this passage Rawls writes about what I have called self-esteem: the least advantaged are recognised for 
their contribution to socially shared goals.  
85 Rawls 2003, p. 131. 
86 O’Neill 2014, p. 89. 
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are located in a competitive environment.87 If these results can be generalised, it is not clear 
that Rawls’ suggestion will solve the problem of positional struggles for social esteem. Since 
property-owning democracy remains a competitive economic system in which both 
production and consumption are organised through market mechanisms, it is plausible that 
citizens would engage in “conquests for dignity” like the Bostonian working class men did 
under a system of welfare-state capitalism, although it may be less pronounced if the degree 
of competition is limited by other principles, such as democratic corporatism.88 In fact, the 
dispersal of productive assets among citizens may increase competitiveness among them, 
because it would make all citizen shareholders and incentivise them to maximise their 
income.     
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper I have argued that living a dignified life requires social esteem as well as 
respect, and that social esteem is the esteem that we are owed for our contribution to socially 
shared goals. Next, I have argued that in the modern capitalist recognition order people gain 
social esteem through their work and, therefore, depend on it for their self-worth. This 
explains why forced unemployment, precarious employment and low paid work are 
experienced as threats to human dignity: they suggest to those who experience them that 
they are of little social usefulness and value to society. Therefore, my interim conclusion was 
that in order to protect the dignity of their members, modern societies must strive to achieve 
full employment, protect employment security and decent pay, and broaden the range of 
estimable activities in which citizens can engage in outside of the workplace or instead of 
paid labour. This is an important addition to the philosophical literature on dignity, which 
usually limits itself to the respect dimension and ignores people’s need for social esteem 
from their peers. 
                                                        
87 Ordabayeva and Chandon 2011. This also suggests that conquests for dignity are not limited to capitalist societies or 
class societies but are likely to occur in all societies in which social relationships are characterised by social competitiveness.  
88 Cf. Hussain 2014.  
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However, my argument in the final section suggests that this may not be enough, and 
that struggles for human dignity in the competitive environments of modern capitalist 
societies also have a dark side, because individuals tend to assert their dignity in a 
comparative and positional way which secures the dignity of some at the cost of the dignity 
of others. As a result, the appeal to the universal equal worth of each human being is turned 
into a competitive quest for self-worth as an experiential quality that props up rather than 
undermines social hierarchies. If my suggestion in the final section is plausible, then we 
should be sceptical about whether people can live dignified lives in societies that are 
characterised by a high degree of social competitiveness, such as modern capitalist societies. 
At the same time, it calls for more research in philosophy, sociology and social psychology, 
because if the argument of this paper is right, then we urgently need to know how to design 
social institutions and to foster social practices that enable people to articulate and maintain 
a sense of human dignity that does not rely on competitive struggles for social esteem. 
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